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THE FEDERAL DISCOVERY PRACTICE SHOULD BE
ADOPTED BY ALL STATES
PHILIP S. VAN CISE*
N SEPTEMBER, 1938 NEW RuLES of procedure were adopted in the
federal courts. Since then many of the states have abandoned their
old codes and in the main followed the new federal procedure. If the
only advantages were that lawyers, in the states which have adopted the
new rules, can practice confidently in both courts, that would be suffi-
cient justification for the change. But when we add to that the results
that pleadings have been simplified, motion days largely dispensed
with, trial dates expedited, facts laid on the table and not concealed
until trial, contested cases shortened, and a large percentage of settle-
ments made before trial, we have a success which is revolutionary
It is doubtful if any state can or will adopt the federal rules verbatim.
There are many matters such as issuance of summons, where the state
practice is superior, in allowing the lawyers to sign them as well as the
clerk,' and thus save time. Also there are other subjects which are
entirely matters of state practice, and not in the federal rules, such as
attachment, claim and delivery, garnishment and replevin actions.
These must be modified to follow the new practice. Then there are
other rules dealing with federal districts in the same or different states,
while in the commonwealths we have districts and counties and state
boundaries.
The federal rules are all subject to change, as there is a Rules Com-
mittee constantly studying them for the purpose of improvement. The
second major change went into effect in September, 1947 So the states
which adopt them must have their rules committee always vigilant,
analyzing state and federal rules and the actions of judges and the bar
so as to plug any loopholes which may develop.
Where the rules are adopted by the states the first step is legislation
authorizing the Supreme Court to enact rules of procedure for all courts
* Of the Denver bar. Colonel Van Cise has had a distinguished record as one of the
leaders of the Colorado bar. He was chairman of the Rules Committee which drafted
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. He is at the present time Chairman of the
judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar Association. The present article was written
at the invitation of the Wasinzgtois Law Review.-ED.
REm. Rxv. STAT. § 221 [P P C. § 2-3].
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of record.2 Then we no longer have the task of lobbying procedure
amendments through the legislature, with the grave chance of garbled
passage thereof. Then there is the drafting of the rules by a committee
which will work intelligently, and the best results will usually be ob-
tained by selecting an ornery chairman and letting him pick his own
committee. Many members from throughout the state should be on
it, but the main group should be in the largest city, so they can meet
regularly once or twice or three times a week if necessary to get the
job done.
Then it must be sold to the lawyers, be approved by the bar associa-
tion, and finally be sold to the Supreme Court.
Then after its adoption is the period in winch the conservative, older
lawyers refuse to read or recognize the new practice and go ahead on
the old basis, only to be bumped badly by the newer members of the
bar who are willing to study and utilize the new practice. To expedite
the understanding of the new order, seminars should be held, first for
judges only, and then for the bar in many sections of the state and the
entire plan explained.
In addition to the lawyers the judges must be educated. And the
older ones are often the hardest to enlighten, and some never are-we
must wait for their successors.
In 1938 the Colorado Bar Association undertook the task of amend-
ing the code and adopting the rules. The writer was selected as the
goat-pardon me, the chairman. And he had the great luck in getting
eighty outstanding Colorado lawyers to serve with him. Toward the
end seventeen were on the revision committee and finished the job. It
was completed in two years and adopted by the Supreme Court Janu-
ary 6, 1941, and became effective three months later. However, Colo-
rado has lagged, and has not yet adopted the 1947 amendments of the
federal rules.
Adequately to discuss the federal rules from a state standpoint re-
quires an analysis of the state provisions in comparison with the
federal, and a comment on both. And it seems to me it is more than
presumptuous for a Colorado lawyer to discuss Washington statutes,
when he knows nothing about that practice and has only looked at
statutory citations which have been furnished him. With that apology
we will take up the discussion.
2 This step has already been taken. [REm. REv. STAT. § 13-1, P P C. § 110-53].
This statute, conferring the rule-making power has been held constitutional. State ex
rel. Foster-Wyman Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770 (1928).
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First and foremost, the federal rules are to simplify procedure and
are liberally construed to secure just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action.'
The great forward step in the rules to facilitate this aim is the dis-
covery procedure, the truth-seeking depositions, interrogatories, the
physical and mental examinations, and the pretrial conferences, all
seeking to get the exact facts, culminating in summary judgments when
the facts become so apparent that no trial at all is necessary
Few members of the bar realize the fact-finding advantages of depo-
sitions and discovery Many fear that a disclosure of their case will
result in unfair advantages being taken by the other side. But if we
really study discovery, committed only to the one principle of getting
all the facts, we will settle a large percentage of our cases out of court;
in many instances we will reduce the trial time by one-half; and we
will not be stunned by unheard of witnesses or surprise testimony
Further, we will facilitate the obtaining of summary judgments under
Rule 56, and rapidly dispose of many cases m that way But we will
have to work a great deal harder before trial in thorough preparation
therefor.
In Washington, the authority to take pretrial depositions is found
in Rule 7 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure, the pertinent por-
tions of which are copied in the footnote.' You will note the following
s Rule 1.
4Rule 7 Rn!. REv. STAT. § 308-7 [P P C. § 93-13], provides in part:(2) Oral Examination Before Trial.
The testimony of a witness may ba taken before any notary public upon oral examination when
such witness is(a An adverse party to the action; orb An offcr, agent, partner, stockholder or employee of an adverse party; or
The next friend, guardian, or guardian ad litem of an infant party or party of unsound
mind who is an adverse party; or(d) A codefendant who has filed and served a cross.complaint against and upon the party
making the examination or against and upon whom such party has filed and served a
cross-complaint; or(e) The person or any of the persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended.
The word "party" or "person" shall not he construed to mean the party at whose instance the
oral examination is had.
The oral examination of a defendant, or of an officer, agent, partner, stockholder, or employee
of a defendant, or of the next friend, guardian, or guardian ad litem of a defendant, or a codefend-
ant, or the person or any of the persons for whose benefit the action is defended, shall not be taken
until the expiration of twenty days after the service of the summons, cross-complaint, or writ ofgarnishment upon such defendant or codefendant: Provided, however, That for good cause shown
the court may permit such examination prior to the expiration of said twenty-day period, and in
such case a copy of the order authorizing the same shall be served with the notice thereof.
The testimony of a witness taken upon oral examination need not be transcribed or certified by
the officer before whom it is taken, or filed, unless requested by a party to the action or proceeding;
but if such witness is not subject to subpoena seasonably issued, the party at whose request the
examination was had may, upon three days' notice to the other party or parties accompanied with
service of a copy of the entire testimony of such witness, prepared at his own expense and duly
certified by the officer taking the same, offer the same, or any part thereof, in evidence, if the witness
be not present at the trial as hereinafter mentioned. Any party other than the one at whose instance
the ora testimony was taken may, if such witness is not subject to subpoena seasonably issued,
apply to the court upon three dlays' notice to the other party or parties for an order directed to such
officer to cause to be transcribed certified, and filed, at the expense of the applicant, such parts of
the testimony of the witness as tae applicant requests; and at tbe time of the hearing on such appli-
cation the other party or parties may request, at his or their expense, the transcription, certification
and filing of such additional parts of the testimony as the court may allow. If the witness is not
present at the trial, the evidence transcribed and certified in accordance with the provisions of this
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important limitations in the rule. The oral examnnation can be only of
an adverse party Its use at the trial is limited and subject to the same
rules as govern other depositions. The rule is silent as to the scope of
the pretrial examination, and it is provided that the examnnation may
not be held before the expiration of twenty days after the service of
summons.
Why should there be this twenty-day limitation on taking the
deposition? Why should not the door be open to let the sunlight in at
all times on all parties and things, without restrictions and without
going to court for permssion?
Under these restrictions you may lose your case because you cannot
take the testimony of a key witness, who now lives in the county, is
well and vigorous and friendly Before trial he may suddenly become
hostile, leave the country or die, and you are helpless.
And the language of the rule seems to mean that all trial restrictions
apply so that no "fishing" or "discovery" will be allowed. Can you now
ask and receive the names of all the witnesses for the other party, or
for the written statements given by them? I doubt it.
Now let us examine the federal rules. What do we find?
FEDERAL RULE 26-DEPOSITIONS
(a) WHEN DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN. Any party may take
the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for
use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. After commencement of
the action the deposition may be taken without leave of court, except that
leave, granted with or without notice, must be obtained if notice of the
taking is served by the plaintiff within 20 days after commencement of the
action. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of sub-
poena as provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance
with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken
only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
We criticize the requirement for leave of court in order for the
plaintiff to take a deposition within twenty days, and no leave is
required in the Colorado rules.
paragraph may be offered in evidence, subject to the same rules as govern depositions. (See Rem.
ev. Stat., § 1244 [P. P. C. § 7729].)
Notice of an oral examination shall be given in the same manner and for the same time as in
the case of taking a deposition. In the case of an oral examination, the party or parties other than
the ,one requesting the examination shall not examine the witness except to enable him to correct or
explain his testimony. No cost or expense of an oral examination of a witness, nor of transcription
or certification of the testimony, shall be taxed as costs or disbursements.
The attendance of persons for oral examination pursuant to said notice, and the answering of
proper interrogatories propounded in the course of any such oral examination, shall be compelled by
the superior court in which the action is pending in the same manner as is provided by law for the
taking of the depositins of witnesses, and the wilful refusal of any person to obey any proper
order of said court in connection therewith shall constitute contempt of court.
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When does the court get jurisdiction so a deposition can be taken?
In Colorado this starts from the time of filing the complaint. So you
can serve your summons, complaint, subpoena, and a notice to take
depositions all at one time. You can take the deposition of any person,
no longer being confined to parties, the sick, or absentees. The field is
yours to search for facts.
You can take a deposition for discovery-to find relevant facts of
any kind-and as said by Judge Moscowitz of New York, in one of the
early decisions on the new rules, "It will not avail a party to raise the
familiar cry of 'fishing expedition.' "I
You can also take a deposition for use as evidence, or you can take it
for both discovery and evidence. Finally, after judgment, in Colorado
under Rule 69 (h) you may also take the deposition of any person, as
well as that of the judgment creditor.
Unlike the Washington rule, which is silent as to the scope of the
pretrial deposition, the federal rule is very explicit and extremely broad.
The examination may cover any matter which is not privileged, and
which is relevant to the general subject matter of the pending action,
whether for the party taking the deposition or the other party, and
the inquiry may extend to the "existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things, and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts."' The last sentence in the section of the federal rule
defining scope of examnation is extremely important. It reads: "It is
not ground for objection that the testimony will be madmissible at the
trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."
Hence there are only two limitations on the deposition-privilege
and relevancy
PRIVILEGE
The privilege of refusing to answer is an option of refusal and not a
prohibition of inquiry This involves incrimination and confidential
communications. Incrimination arises both in criminal matters and in
tort actions when a penalty is demanded and the action becomes penal.
5 Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F Supp. 80 (E. D. N. Y. 1938), the
United States Supreme Court recently echoed this sentiment in Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U. S. 495, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).6 Rule 26, subsection (b).
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Hence when such damages are demanded the defendant may refuse to
testify and claim his constitutional privilege.'
Are the statements obtained by insurance companies privileged and
confidential, so that you cannot see them or get the names of wit-
nesses? The decisions hold that you can take the depositions of the
companies and get this data.'
The other party's trial preparations, however, cannot be obtained
by deposition. As to this Judge Moscowitz said.
The rules were not intended to be made a vehicle through which one
litigant could make use of his opponent's preparation of his case. To use
them in such a manner would penalize the diligent and place a premium on
laziness. Except in the most unusual circumstances, no such result was
intended.9
RELEVANCY
While the material sought must be relevant, it is not always easy
in advance of issue to make that deternunation with accuracy Two
methods of approach are suggested; first, if the deposition is taken
before answer then anything is material which would be adhussible
under any possible answer to the complaint, or stated another way, the
test is not whether the matter inquired of will be competent at the trial,
but whether it may be; and second, relevancy should be liberally
construed.
A federal court construed relevancy in the Air Lines case and held
that this subdivision does not limit examination to matters relevant to
the precise issue, but allows any inquiry relevant to the general subject
matter of the action. It said. "To the extent that the examination
develops useful information, it functions successfully as an instrument
of discovery, even if it produces no testimony directly admissible." 1°
As the names of witnesses are relevant, you can ask plaintiff or
defendant who any of their witnesses are and subpoena them and take
their depositions. This practice approves an 1887 dictum of William
Howard Taft--"witnesses do not belong to one party more than to
another. '
7 28 R. C. L. 425, Gadsen v. Woodward, 8 N. E. 653 (N. Y. 1886), Fries v. Burgher.
7 Halsted 79, 21 Am. Dec. 52 (N. J. 1830).
8 Bough v. Lee, 26 F Supp. 1,000 (S. D. N. Y. 1939), Kulich v. Murray, 28 F
Supp. 675 (S. D. N. Y. 1939), Price v. Levitt, 29 F Supp. 164 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
9 McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F Supp. 585 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
10 Lewis v. United Air Lines, 27 F Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1939).
11 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Co., 9 Ohio Dec. 801, 812 (Super. Ct.) (1887)
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USE OF DEPOSITIONS
The Washington rule on pretrial depositions applies only to parties,
is silent as to scope, and contains no specific provision as to the use of
the deposition on the trial. The other sections of the rule as to use of
depositions are concerned with the ordinary depositions provided for.
Thus the Washington procedure is quite restricted. The federal rule
goes into great detail as to the use of depositions on the trial and is
very broad."2 Discovery depositions may be freely used for impeach-
ment, and the court is also given wide discretion in whether or not to
admit the deposition for other purposes.
EFFECT OF TAKING OR USING DEPOSITIONS
We find no Washington statute on this subject. This section is all-
important, because under the federal and Colorado practice no longer
is an mcompetent witness made competent by taking his deposition.
And this becomes particularly valuable in will contests, in which dis-
covery can be obtained without making a competent witness for the
opponent.
The federal subdivision:
(f) EFFECT OF TAKING OR USING DEPOSITIONS. A party
shall not be deemed to make a person his own witness for any purpose by
taking is deposition. The introduction in evidence of the deposition or
any part thereof for any purpose other than that of contradicting or im-
peacing the deponent makes the deponent the witness of the party intro-
ducing the deposition, but this shall not apply to the use by an adverse party
of a deposition as described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of this
12 Rule 26 (d) provides:
(d) USE OF DEPOSITIONS. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
used against any party who was present or represented at the talng of the deposition or who had
due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching
the testimony of deponent as a witness.
(2) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an
ofcer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association
which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: I, that the witness is dead; or 2, that the witness is at a greater distance
than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears
that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or 3, that the
witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity or imprisonment; or 4, that
the party offering the deposition has bean unable to procure the attendance of the witness by sub.
poena or 5, upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstanccs exist as to make it
desitable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimonyof witesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require
him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce anyother parts.
Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use depositionspreviously taken; and, when
an action in any court of the United Stes or of any state has been dismissed and another action
mvolving the same subject matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their representa-
tives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may
be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor.
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rule. At the trial or hearing any party may rebut any relevant evidence
contained in a deposition whether introduced by him or by any other
party ' 8
However, to make certain of incompetency continuing we in Colo-
rado have added a few words to the first sentence (new words itali-
cized) "A party shall not be deemed to have waived his objection to
the competency of nor to have made a person his own witness for any
purpose by taking his deposition."
However, if you use the deposition of an otherwise incompetent wit-
ness, except to impeach or contradict the deponent, you waive your
objection to his competency and make him your own witness. But if
he is an officer of a corporation, or group, as described in subdivision
(d) (2), you do not in any manner make the deponent your witness
by using his deposition.
The last sentence in this rule is very interesting and must be care-
fully examined. It states: "At the trial or hearing any party may rebut
any relevant evidence contained in a deposition whether introduced by
him or any other party" The reason for this rule is that the discovery
value of a deposition is emphasized over the evidentiary use, and the
result is that you may introduce all or part of a deposition and then
turn around and rebut it, and thus impeach your own deponent at will.
Federal rule 28 goes into considerably more detail than the Wash-
ington law in designating the persons before whom depositions may
be taken.'" Federal rule 29 provides that "If the parties so stipulate
in writing, depositions may be taken before any person at any time or
place, upon any notice and in any manner, and when so taken, may be
used like other depositions." Under this rule, by stipulation, you can
disregard all technical requirements and take depositions before any
person at any time or place, and in any manner. There is no statutory
authority in Washington for taking depositions on stipulation. How-
ever, it seems to be the practice. It would be well to have this matter
made clear by rule. We advise the use of stipulations as timesavers.
Courteous attorneys will always make them, boors will require notice
-and, in such cases, all you can do is to demand complete adherence
to the rules.
"Rule 26 (f).
14 For the Washington law see REM. REv. STAT. §§ 1233, 1239 [P P C. §§ 39-13,
39-3].
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ORDERS FOR PROTECTION OF PARTIES AND DEPONENTS
There appears to be no Washington statute on this all important
subdivision. The federal one is:
ORDERS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PARTIES AND DE-
PONENTS. After notice is served for taking a deposition by oral exami-
nation, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be
examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the
action is pending may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken,
or that it may be taken only at some designated place other than that stated
in the 'notice, or that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or
that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the
action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition
shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret processes, develop-
ments, or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall simul-
taneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; or the court may make any
other order wich justice requires to protect the party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.1
Up to this time you may be saying, there is no limit on who can be
interrogated, what he can be asked, how much he can be abused, and
how the rich can harass the poor! We have now arrived at the answer
to those objections, which is the control exercised by the court over
deposition procedure. The court had that power before, but it wasn't
defined and few lawyers knew how to invoke it, but these rules now
give it in full.
Suppose you are served with notice to take a deposition, and you
want to object to all or part of the proceedings. You prepare a motion
and notice and take it to the court. For good cause the court may abso-
lutely forbid the taking of the deposition. This is very drastic and
should only be used in extreme cases-and even then the court, if pos-
sible, should take that particular deposition. An interesting provision
where one party fears that another will manufacture documentary evi-
dence is that the court may require that the parties simultaneously file
specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes ,to be
opened as directed by the court.
However, it is not intended that these subdivisions should be made
the basis of an application to the court in every case and such motions
are not regarded with much favor, especially when made before the
deposition has commenced. In practice they have been generally denied.
15 Rule 30 (b).
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The court may also make any order which justice requires to protect
the witness or party from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
An instance occurs when an attorney attempts to intimidate a deponent.
If this is carried to an extreme, you may interrupt the deposition and
notify counsel that his conduct will cease at once, and that if it does
not you will discontinue the hearing and report his conduct to the court
for action. This should be effective, as there is no oqcasion for anything
but gentlemanly conduct by counsel, both in the taking of depositions
and in court trials.
When bad faith occurs, and you so demand, the officer must suspend
the deposition, and then you file a motion with the court asking for
relief. It may order the deposition terminated, or that it be resumed
only on its order. And the court may require either party, or the wit-
ness, to pay such costs or expenses as the court may deem reasonable.
However, you don't want to be too captious with your objection.
Don't invoke the aid of the court unless you are clearly entitled to it.
Then and then only should the court act. And when it does act a
penalty should be quickly imposed. And don't forget that the party,
the client, is the one who is penalized for the conduct of his attorney
This should not be very healthy for the lawyer either.
RECORD OF EXAMINATION-OATH-OBJECTIONS
The Washington statute dates from 1854, and the applicable portion
of Sec. 1244 is as follows:
It shall be the duty of the person taking the deposition to propound to the
witness every question proposed by either party and to note all objections
to the form of any interrogatory, and when any interrogatory is objected to
on account of form, unless the form is amended and the objection waived,
he shall write after the question, and before the answer, the words "objected
to" and when any witness declines to answer a question on the ground that
it will (tend to) criminate himself, that fact shall also be noted after the
question, if written down. The deposition may be taken in the form of a
narrative, or by question and answer, or partly in either form, as either
party present at the examination shall first write down the question and
then the answer, as nearly as may be, in the language of the witness.
The federal subdivision is more modern.
RECORD OF EXAMINATION, OATH, OBJECTIONS. The
officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the witness on
oath and shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in
his presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be
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taken stenographically and transcribed unless the parties agree otherwise.
All objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications of
the officer taking the deposition, or to the manner of taking it, or to the
evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party, and any other objection
to the proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the deposition. Evi-
dence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections. In lieu of par-
ticipating in the oral examnation, parties served with notice of taking
a deposition may transmit written interrogatories to the officer, who shall
propound them to the witness and record the answers verbatim."0
MOTION TO TERMINATE OR LIMIT DEPOSITION
We find no similar Washington provision. The federal one is:
MOTION TO TERMINATE OR LIMIT EXAMINATION. At
any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or of
the deponent and upon a .showing that the examination is being conducted
in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the action is pending or
the court in the district where the deposition is being taken may order the
officer conducting the examnation to cease forthwith from taking the
deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposi-
tion as provided in subdivision (b). If the order made terminates the
examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only upon the order of the
court in which the action is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party
or deponent, the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time
necessary to make a motion for an order. In granting or refusing such order
the court may impose upon either party or upon the witness the requirement
to pay such costs or expenses as the court may deem reasonable.Y
I
SUBMISSION TO WITNESS-CHANGES-SIGNING
Washington Section 1244 in part is as follows:
but when the deposition is read to the witness previous to signing it,
he shall be permitted to amend his answer to any question, or any part of
his deposition, such amendment, however, unless both parties shall other-
wise agree, shall not be made by way of interlining or erasing, but shall be
added at the end of the deposition under the title, "amendment by the wit-
ness," and such amendment shall intelligently refer to the part so amended.
This portion was far superior to the usual state practice of amend-
ments by interlineation.
Section 1242 prescribed how the deposition shall be taken and certi-
fied, as follows:
18 Rule 30 (c).
17 Rule 30 (d).
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Sec. 1242. HOW TAKEN AND CERTIFIED. The deposition shall
be written by the officer taking the same, or by the witness, or by some
disinterested person, in the presence and under the direction of such officer.
When completed, it shall be carefully read to or by the witness, corrected
if desired, and subscribed by him. If taken upon notice, it shall be certified
by the officer substantially as follows [Then follows the form of the
certificate by the officer.]
If the deposition be taken upon a commission, the commission(er) shall
testify (certify) it in substantially the same manner, and annex to it the
commission and interrogatories.
The federal subdivision is better as it enables the deposition to be
used even though not signed.
SUBMISSION TO WITNESS, CHANGES, SIGNING. When the
testimony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted to the wit-
ness for examination and shall be read to or by him, unless such examina-
tion and reading are waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes
in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered
upon the deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by
the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be signed by the
witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing or the witness
is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition is not signed
by the witness, the officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact of the
waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal
to sign together with the reason, if any, given therefor, and the deposition
may then be used as fully as though signed, unless on a motion to suppress
under Rule 32(d) the court holds that the reasons given for the refusal to
sign require rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.18
Note this new practice: When the witness desires to make changes
the officer and not the witness makes them, and the officer must state
the reasons given by the witness for the change. The deponent should
sign it, but the signing may be waived, under the circumstances stated
in the rule.
FAILURE TO ATTEND OR SERVE SUBPOENAS
The Washington statutes adequately cover the situation where a
witness refuses to attend the taking of a deposition, by providing that
the court may compel attendance and issue a citation for contempt for
refusal to attend. 9 The federal rule goes further and provides that if
the party giving the notice of the taking of a deposition fails to attend
and proceed therewith, and another party attends in person or by attor-
is Rule 30 (e).
19 REM. REv. STAT. §§ 1235-1238 [P P C. §§ 39-31, 39-35].
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ney, the court may order the party giving the notice to pay such other
party the amount of his reasonable expenses plus attorney's fees.2" It
also provides that if the party giving the notice fails to serve a subpoena
upon the witness, and the witness does not attend, if another party
attends m person or by attorney because he expects the deposition of
the witness to be taken, the court may order the party giving the notice
to pay such other party the amount of his reasonable expenses plus
attorney's fees.
DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS BY WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES
The only authority for discovery depositions in Washington is rule 7
of the rules of practice and procedure, and it provides only for oral
examination. There is no provision for discovery depositions by written
interrogatories. The federal rules make provision, for this,' and it is
obvious that some provision should be made for it in Washington.
There are times when a discovery deposition may be effectively con-
ducted by written interrogatories, and it is much more inexpensive.
This rule, when adapted to state practice, applies only to cases
pending in the state court. It applies to any witness, and must be dis-
tinguished from rule 33 which only applies to parties. It does not gov-
ern the procedure at depositions taken in the state for use in actions
instituted in the courts of other states.
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
In 1854 the Washington Legislature passed a statute providing that
the plaintiff, at the time of filing his complaint or afterwards, and the
defendant at the time of filing his answer or afterwards, may file writ-
ten interrogatories with the clerk "for the discovery of facts and docu-
ments material to the support or defense of the action, to be answered
on oath by the adverse party "" This was merely a codification of the
old equity practice, a method by which the pleader obtained admissions
in support of his own case. It was not a discovery device concerning the
case of his opponent. The Washington Supreme Court, in an unbroken
line of decisions, has adhered to this interpretation, and has held that
the interrogatories under this section cannot be used as a "fishing
expedition.""2
-o Rule 30 (g).
21 Rule 31,
221ER. Ray. STAT. §§ 1226, 1227 [P P C. §§ 42-3, 42-5].
23 Cully v. No. Pac. Ry., 35 Wash. 241, 77 Pac. 202 (1904), State ex rel. Bronson
v. Superior Court, 194 Wash. 339, 77 P. (2d) 997 (1938).
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Federal rule 33 provides for interrogatories to parties, and as
amended it provides that the interrogatories may relate to any matters
which can be inquired into under rule 26(b) In other words, the scope
of inquiry is extremely broad, and such interrogatories may be used for
discovery purposes, not only in support of the pleader's case, but to find
out what the opponent's case is about.
This is a short cut to avoid depositions, and if you draft proper
questions you will save a lot of time. You should ask all your questions
at one time, because a second set may meet objections. This method
is not exclusive of depositions, both may be used, though there are
some limitations against duplication of the same data in depositions,
after interrogatories or vice versa.
This rule only involves parties and does not apply to any other wit-
nesses. As bills of particular have been dispensed with, in an action on
contract, if you are the defendant you serve interrogatories and ask
your opponent to state either (a) that the contract was written and the
exhibit which you attach is a true copy thereof or (b) that it was oral,
and the terms thereof.
INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS
The applicable Washington statute again has its origin in the year
1854, at a time when photography was virtually unknown.2 It author-
izes a court to require either party to permit an inspection or copying
of documents in his possession containing evidence relating to the
merits of the action or defense. In view of the age of the statute, and
in view of the interpretation of the statute previously discussed, it is
believed that this statute would not warrant the inspection and copying
of documents for discovery purposes, .e., for finding out what the
other fellow's case is about.
The federal rule on this subject is extremely broad,2" and provides
that the scope of inquiry will be as broad as the scope of inquiry on
oral depositions, and that it will also permit copying and photographing
of any designated documents, papers, books, etc., or tangible things.
It further authorizes an entry upon designated land, or other property,
for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing
the property, or any designated object, or operation thereon, within
the scope of the examination permitted by rule 26(b) Note that
2 4 REM. REV. STAT. § 1262 [P P C. § 44-I].
25 Rule 34.
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inspection under this rule is only on, motion, notice, and good cause
therefor.
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATIONS
The Washington statute was enacted in915:
On or before the trial of any action brought to recover damages for
injury to the person, the court before whom such action is pending may
from time to time, on application of any party therein, order and direct an
examination of the person injured as to the injury complained of by a
competent physician or physicians, surgeon or surgeons, in order to qualify
the person or persons making such examination to testify in the said cause
as to the nature, extent and probable duration of the injury complained of,,
and the court may in such order direct and determine the time and place
of such examination. Provided, this section shall not be construed to
prevent any other person or physician from being called and examined as a
witness heretofore.2 6
Note this section is limited to an action for damages from an injury,
and is not available in any other cases, such as insanity hearings.
The federal rule is broader and more helpful for the discovery of
facts:
(a) ORDER FOR EXAMINATION. In an action in which the mental
or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the
action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental examina-
tion by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for good cause
shown and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties
and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the
examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
(b) REPORT OF FINDINGS.
(1) If requested by the person examined, the party causing the examina-
tion to be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of
the examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions. After such
request and delivery the party causing the examination to be made shall be
entitled upon request to receive from the party examined a like report of
any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the same mental or
physical condition. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report the
court on motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such
terms as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a report
the court may exclude his testimony if offered at the trial.
(2) By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered
or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any
privilege he may have in that action or any other involving the same con-
troversy, regarding the testimony 'of every other person who has examined
26 REm. REV. STAT. § 1230-1 [P P C. § 42-13].
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or may thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or physical
condition.
27
This rule was held constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 8 Under it a person can be forced to
submit to physical examination m proper cases.
Note this rule gives the trial court an unqualified right, where a
party's mental or physical condition is in controversy, to order him to
submit to a physical or mental examnation by a physician. The rule
then does the fair thing and entitles the examined party, upon request,
to a copy of the complete report of the exarming physician.
But if he wants that medical report he must, on request, produce all
reports of the same mental or physical condition, made about him by
his physician. And if any doctor fails or refuses to give such report his
testimony may be excluded at the trial.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
Washington's rule 21 is the same as the federal rule before the
amendments in 1947 It provides in substance that a party may serve
upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter
of the genuineness of any relevant documents or of matters of fact set
forth therein, and that if the party to whom the request is addressed
does not file a sworn statement denying the matter within ten days it
will be deemed to be admitted.
The 1947 amendment to this rule eliminated one ambiguity, and
also made provision for objections to the form of the requests, which
was not covered by the original rule. These were matters which had
caused the court some confusion and the rule is now clarified. Wash-
ington should likewise clarify its rule.
REFUSAL TO MAKE DISCOVERY
Washington has two sanctions for refusal to make discovery One is
in rule 21, paragraph 3, which provides for the allowance of expenses
for refusal to admit the genuineness of documents. The other is R. R. S.
1230, providing for the striking of pleadings and entering of a default.
The latter is a very drastic remedy, and the courts have been loath to
invoke it.29
"1 Rule 35.
28 312 U. S. 1, 85 L. Ed. 479 (1941).
20 Knapp v. Order of Pendo, 36 Wash. 601, 79 Pac. 209 (1904), Haas v. Wash.
Water Power Co., 93 Wash. 291, 160 Pac. 954 (1916), Gostina v. Whitham, 148 Wash.
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Depositions are serious matters under the rules and advantage is not
to be taken of the notary's lack of power to compel answers. If a
deponent refuses to answer a question, application may be made to the
court to compel the answer. Here is where the courts should start to
prevent the horseplay which so often mars deposition procedure;
Under the federal practice if the court finds that the refusal to answer
was without substantial justification, it may require the party or the
deponent or the attorney to pay the expenses incurred, including
reasonable attorney's fees. On the other hand, if there was no substan-
tial justification for the questions, the other party or his attorney may
have to pay similar sums. The federal rule makes this penalty manda-
tory The courts should carefully scrutinize deposition procedure and
inflict penalties where needed.
Failure to comply with the order of the court is contempt, and
severe penalties can be inflicted for refusal to make discovery Among
these are adjudging that documents or property are as claimed; refus-
ing to allow the disobedient party to make certain claims or defenses,
or to introduce certain evidence; striking out pleadings or portions
thereof; or dismissing the action, or rendering judgment against the
offenders.3" In other words, discovery means just what it says-make
complete disclosure to the other party or abide the consequences.
72, 268 Pac. 132 (1928). Rm. REv. STAT. § 1262 [P P C. § 44-1), providing for the
inspection and copying of books and documents, contains its own sanctions for refusal.
However, as pointed out above in the text, this statute is really not a discovery device
in the true sense.
-30 The federal rules contain the most complete arsenal of sanctions found in any
jurisdiction. Rule 37 provides:
(a) REFUSAL TO ANSWER. If a party or other deponent refuses to answer any question
propounded upon oral examination the examination shall be completed on other matters or adjourned
as the proponent of the question may prefer. Thereafter, on reasonable notice to all persons affected
thereby, he may apply to the court in the distnct where the deposition is taken for an order com-
elling an answer. Upon the refusal of a deponent to answer any interrogatory submitted under
ule 31 or upon the refusal of a party to answer any interrpato7r submitted under Rule 33, the
proponent of the question may on like notice make like application or such an order. If the motion
is granted and if the court finds that the refusal was without substantial justification the court
shall require the refusing party or deponent and the party or attorney advising the refusal or
either of them to pay to the examining party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney's fees. If the motion is denied and if the court
finds that the motion was made without substantial justification, the court shall require the examining
party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to the refusing party or witness the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's
fees. (b) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER.(1) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer any ques-
tion after being directed to do so by the court in the district in wnch the deposition is being taken,
the refusal may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Other consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey
an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or
an order made under Rule 34 to produce any/document or other thing for inspection, copying, or
photographing or to permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an
order made under Rule 35 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court
may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:(i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked, or the character or
descnption of the thing or land, or the contents of the paper, or the physical or mental condition
of the party, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(ii) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims
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The tendency of the federal courts on these penalties is not to inflict
them if the parties, in good faith, seek a construction of the rules, or
where they are clearly unfamiliar with their operation. However,
denial of motions for penalties has been conditioned on the party's
compliance with the request. 1
To summarize, in general start your discovery with written interroga-
tories to parties under rule 33, then if necessary use depositions, under
either rules 30 or 31, and finish with requests for admissions of docu-
ments and facts under rule 36. In damage cases get your medical
reports under rule 35. Then settle the issues at the pretrial procedure.
If these tools are properly used either the case will be settled out of
court, or the trial time may be reduced as much as 5o per cent. Dis-
covery is here-invoke its use!
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
Colorado adopted this federal rule verbatim. The state of Wash-
ington in 1942 adopted all but paragraph 5,82 under which the court
and attorneys would consider the "advisability of a preliminary refer-
ence of issues to a master for findings to be used as evidence when the
trial is to be by jury" The omission is probably of no consequence, as
the court could doubtless do this regardless of a rule.
The success or failure of this rule depends entirely upon the judge.
In Colorado U S. District Judge J. Foster Symes has made an out-
standing success of this innovation. He uses it in every type of case, and
as a result more than 50 per cent of the cases are settled. Some of our
or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated documents or things or
items of testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical or mental condition:
(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the
order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment
by default against the disobedient party-(iv) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order directing the arrest
of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders except an order to submit to a
physical or mental examination.
(c) EXPENSES ON REFUSAL TO ADMIT. If a party, after being served with a request
under Rule 36 to admit the genuineness of any documents or the truth of any matters of fact, serves
a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness
of any such document -or the truth of any such matter of fact, he may apply to the court for an
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making such proof,
including reasonable attorney's fees. Unless the court finds that there were good reasons for the
denial or that the admission sought were of no substantial importance the order shall be made.
(d) FAILURE OF PARTY TO ATTEND OR SERVE ANSWERS. If a party or an officer
or managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition,
after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers tp interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice may strike
out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or enter a udgment by default against that party.
(e) FAILURE TO RESPOND TO LETTERS ROGATORY. A subpoena may be issued as
provided i the Act of uly 3, 1926, c. 762, Sec. 1 (44 Stat. 835), U. S. C., Title 28, Sec. 711,under the circumstances and conditions therein stated.
(f) EXPENSES AGAINST UNITED STATES. Expenses and attorney's fees are not to he
imposed upon the United States under this rule.3' Dannv. Cornagnie General, 29 F Supp. 330 (E. D. N. Y. 1939)
Rules of Practice and Procedure 18, RET . REV. STAT. § 308-18 [P P C. § 93-35].
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state district judges (corresponding to the Washington Superior Court)
have done equally well, some do only fair jobs, and some hold no con-
ferences at all. Many lawyers are very loath to put all their cards on
the table, but want to keep back some for surprises at the trial-en-
tirely overlooking the fact that the other fellow may have still better
ones.
But let us analyze this procedure and see whether or not our client
gains therefrom. And we must at all times remember that the interests
of the clients are paramount.
We believe that most trial lawyers will agree that cases are won in
the office by thorough preparation, rather than in court by flashes of
brilliancy Even then many of our cases are blown up by facts we never
heard of. Under the old practice a trial was a contest of lawyers, with
interminable delays over matters which were incontestable, and with
little narrowing of the issues before trial. Does not the honest lawyer
prefer to know all facts before trial, so that if he has no case it will
blow up in the office instead of in the courtroom? Discovery and pre-
trial procedure will bring that result.
We belibve that pretrial procedure should be compulsory in all cases
and that it should be about thirty days in advance of trial.
Here are some instances of nonappreciation of pretrial procedure
which have come to our attention.
One judge holds his pretrial conference at 9 30 a.m. and starts his
trials at 1o a.m.!
One judge states: "Is there anything you agree upon? If so, state it
in the record."
Another- "Issues of law will not be discussed because the Supreme
Court might make new law before trial."
Another" "Only a few cases should go to pretrial, and those shouldn't
take over half an hour."
In order thoroughly to grasp the advantages of pretrial, members of
the bar should read the material which is being printed on the subject.
Two excellent articles have just recently been issued and we will quote
from each.
The judicial section of the American Bar Association has printed
"Pre-trial in the United States," an article by Harvey D Nims of
New York. He starts with this question.
"The settlement of civil disputes in a satisfactory manner is a necessary
part of the economic life of all civilized communities. The procedure for the
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settlement of disputes can no more remain static than any other branch of
the life of the community but must be adapted or altered from time to time
to meet changing conditions." (The London Chamber of Commerce
Report on "Expense of Litigation" (1930) p. 1.)
Then he states:
In the past eighteen years, or thereabouts, different types of pretrial have
developed, such as the following
1. Where the court holds such conferences only when counsel request
them and confines the conference to voluntary agreements or stipulations
by counsel regarding documentary exhibits and other evidence. Occasionally
settlements result from such conferences.
2. Where the court orders pretrial in selected cases but at the conference
makes little or no effort to do more than approve and record stipulations and
agreements reached by counsel voluntarily and to obtain estimates of the
probable length of the trial for calendar or docket purposes.
3. Where the court orders pretrial, as a matter of course, in practically
all pending cases, and the judge attending the conference examines the
pleadings, discusses the issues with counsel, seeks to obtain stipulations
reducing the number of witnesses and exhibits, removes non-essential
issues, and explores and discusses the possibility of settlement.
The results in the Circuit Court of Michigan, at Detroit, are
astonishing.
Reports of the court show the percentage of civil cases ready for trial
which this court disposed of on the pretrial heanng 1939-57.6%, 1940-
64.2%, 1941-54.3 , 1942-61.9%, 1943-52.3%, 5 year average-58.1%.
In 1946 this court actually tried only 649 law cases, while 754 were
settled at the pretrial hearing. On the chancery side 330 were tried and 5224
disposed of at pretrial. The last figure reflects the increased number of
divorce cases settled before trial. This is in addition to 8954 pro confesso
divorce cases. The pretrial work, on the law side, took the time of one
judge, the chancery pretrial took the time of four judges. This court dis-
posed of 23,839 cases in 1946.
Judge Cornelius J. Harrington of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, reports that in the court year ending July i, 1947, some 5oo
cases were settled at pretrial in amounts totaling over $3,ooo,ooo.
The Superior Court of Massachusetts for Suffolk County (Boston)
began the use of pretrial in 1935 and has continued to do so.
In this court, in the 1945-46 court year, 1,677 of its cases were sent to
trial after having been pretried, while 1,923 were disposed of on the pretrial
list or before they were sent out for trial.
The statistics from many other courts show the real results obtained.
THE FEDERAL DISCOVERY PRACTICE
Now for a little of the procedure and some more comments.
In Burton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co.,88 Judge Claude McColloch,
U S. District Judge of Oregon, granted a new trial because the parties
had not revealed facts at the pretrial hearing. He stated:
I can sympathize with the desire of counsel, experienced in the older
forms of practice, to withhold disclosure of such dramatic issues until the
midst of trial, but it must be made clear that surprise, both as a weapon of
attack and defense, is not to be tolerated under the new Federal procedure.
In view of the known (and one of the primary) objectives of the New
Rules of Civil Procedure, to eliminate surprise as a trial tactic, one can
hardly imagine a greater breach of the spirit of the New Rules than to deny
to an injured man the right to show by the doctor attending him the fullest
circumstances of his case, but exactly that happened in this case upon the
insistence of defendants' counsel that an exposition of the medical aspects
of the case could not be made on rebuttal. Plaintiff's counsel would, of
course, have called the attending physician in his case in chief had he been
apprised that defendants intended by oral evidence and demonstration to
dispute the lnd of acid burn which plaintiff claimed to have suffered.
Faithfully administered in spirit, as my senior colleague and I are endeav-
oring to administer them, the new rules outlaw the sporting theory of
justice from Federal courts.
The factual defense that plaintiff was burned by sulphuric acid and not
by muriatic acid should have been disclosed at the pre-tnal hearing. Failure
to disclose it was contrary to the spirit of the New Rules of Civil Procedure
that surprise should be eliminated as a trial tactic, and contrary as well to
the purpose and spirit of pre-tnal procedure as established and conducted in
this court. The failure to disclose that this was to be an important defense
on the facts prevented plaintiff from having a fair trial, in that plaintiff's
counsel was deprived of the opportunity to meet this defense.
Judge Bolitha J Laws, Chief Justice of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, gives one of the very best outlines
of the procedure and its benefits:
The Judges of our Court have found the procedure to be effective. The
clarification of the issues has been an important phase of the work, as has
been the bringing about stipulations of testimony and documents, and com-
promise of cases.
I think there can be no question but that pre-trial procedure has become
very popular in this jurisdiction. Occasionally we hear complaints but they
are usually directed against the manner of handling certain phases of the
procedure, rather than against the procedure itself. Wherever the judge
has performed the work efficiently and has cooperated with the lawyers, I
think the overwhelming sentiment has been in favor of the procedure.
88 1 Fed. Rules Dec. 571 (D. Ore. 1941).
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The first thing which a judge should do at pre-trial is to require counsel
for both sides to make a full and complete opening statement, precisely as
he would at the final trial, as to what he expects to prove. When these state-
ments are made, the pre-trial judge will ask a number of questions and will
comment freely upon some of the points.
After these discussions, which seldom last over 15 or 20 minutes, I under-
take the task of dictating the controlling issues to a typist in open court.
After dictating the issues about which the case was to be tried, the court
uniformly would ask counsel the basis upon which they would settle the case.
The next topic to be covered has to do with obtaining admissions and
stipulations. It is common practice to stipulate with respect to many items of
evidence. The stipulations generally relate to such matters as ownership of
premises, condition of weather, hospital records, medical expenses, photo-
graphs, and plates, whether the party is a corporation or a partnership,
whether the party was the agent or servant of another, and many other
points as to which there is no real controversy In this connection, in actions
for personal injury a notation at pre-trial is always made as to whether or
not the plaintiff claims permanent injuries and, if he does, what is the nature
of the permanent injury claimed.
These stipulations should be definite. The exhibits should be brought to
the pre-trial identified by the initials of the Court. All points such as waiving
production of originals, proofs of signatures, proof of regular course of
business, and other technical points should be specifically waived. The
questions should be settled so that at the final trial the only question to be
determined is whether the exhibit is relevant or material.
We also suggest that the members of the bar secure copies of the
second section of the New Jersey Law Journal, of March 25, 1948, m
which Justice Bolitha Laws, supra, conducted three pretrial confer-
ences, with very able counsel participating, these being a reproduction
of the actual previous pretrial conferences in the respective cases.
Harvey Nims sums up his excellent paper with these statements:
Is the function of a court merely to provide a forum for trial where the
judge acts as an umpire of the contest, or is it its duty to the public and to
jurymen and witnesses, who must give their mite with little or no compen-
sation, to insist that lawyers and litigants cooperate with the court to sim-
plify trials and eliminate technicality in reasonable ways?
To the litigant, the end sought is not the development of juridicial prin-
ciples, but a fair, reasonable and quick disposition of his case with the least
possible expenditure of his time and money
Pre-trial does not involve exciting courtroom contests, so dear to our
forefathers, which even now have an appeal to the public when distinguished
lawyers battle. But the excitement and public interest of such trials do not
justify the delay and the cost, in time and money, which they impose upon
the litigant and taxpayer. There is much to be said for substituting for most
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of them a calm and matter-of-fact discussion in the quiet of a judge's
chambers.
The advocates of pre-trial do not suggest that all cases should be disposed
of by mediation instead of trial, but they do say that a very large proportion
of the cases which are now tried can be more effectively and more economic-
ally disposed of by pre-trial with greater satisfaction to the litigants.
Important to the success of pre-trial procedure as is the cooperation of
the Bar, its future seems to rest primarily with the judges, for a judge can
order such conferences in any case and can insist that when held they are
effective. If judges, generally, become convinced that public interest is best
served by the prompt disposition of controversies with just as little expense
and delay to the litigants as is possible, substantial progress seems certain.
The existing lack of public confidence in our courts is due in no small
measure to the fact that lawyers and judges dislike change and innovation
in legal methods.
Concluszon. The experience of our courts with pre-trial seems to demon-
strate beyond question that it can. (1) reduce the expense of litigation to
litigants, (2) reduce the time required of jury-men and witnesses, (3)
reduce the time required to reach cases for trial, (4) enable courts to reduce
calendar congestion, (5) dispose of one-third to one-half of pending cases
without trial, usually to the satisfaction of the interested parties since such
dispositions must be by agreement; (6) reduce the number of appeals with
their attendant delay and expense, since all cases disposed of in the pre-trial
conference are ended there for good and all, (7) do much to restore public
confidence in the courts.
